Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009) , we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present roommate markets with no and with a non-singleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Examples 1 and 2).
Introduction
In a roommate market (Gale and Shapley, 1962) , a finite set of agents has to be partitioned into pairs (roommates) and singletons. We refer to such a partition as a matching. Each agent has strict preferences over each of the other agents (i.e., sharing a room with him/her) and staying alone (or relying on an outside option). Hence, a roommate market is a simple example of hedonic coalition as well as network formation. In hedonic coalition formation (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002) , a set of agents has to be partitioned and agents have preferences over coalitions (i.e., all subsets of agents). Thus, for roommate markets coalition formation is restricted to coalitions of at most two agents. In network formation (Jackson and Watts, 2002) , links between agents can be established and agents have preferences over their links (or even the entire network structure). Thus, for roommate markets network formation is restricted to at most one link per agent (and agents have preferences over this direct link only). Moreover, a roommate market can be interpreted as an extension of one of the most famous and simplest types of (two-sided) matching markets, a so-called marriage market. In a marriage market, agents are either male or female, and a man (woman) only wants to be matched to a woman (man) or to him(her)self. This setting is equivalent to a roommate market where the set of agents consists of two disjoint subsets and every agent in a certain subset prefers staying alone to being matched to another agent in the same subset. Hence, roommate markets are a particularly interesting class of matching markets because they lie in the "intersection" of network and coalition formation models.
In all the matching, coalition, and network models mentioned above, stability is a central property. For roommate markets, a matching is stable if all roommates are mutually acceptable and no pair of agents would prefer to be roommates instead of having their current matches. For marriage and roommate markets this (pairwise) stability notion is known to be equivalent to core stability. However, when extending the class of marriage markets to the class of roommate markets a problem occurs: while the core for a marriage market is always non-empty, the core of a roommate market can well be empty (Gale and Shapley, 1962) . As a consequence, roommate markets can be considered an important benchmark for the development of solution concepts for matching, network, and coalition formation models that may exhibit an empty core or an empty set of stable matchings or network/coalition structures.
1
Solution concepts can be either categorized as myopic or farsighted. The core would be an example of a myopic solution concept based on a direct dominance relation that formalizes the existence of blocking pairs. Using this direct dominance relation, Ehlers (2007) and Wako (2008) analyze von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for marriage markets.
2 By adding enforceability (loosely speaking, the way a matching changes into an-other matching when blocking pairs are matched) to direct dominance, myopic dynamic solution concepts can be considered as well. In one branch of the "dynamic literature," individual decisions to match with other agents (or to establish a link or join a coalition) are myopic because agents only consider the new enforced matching (or network or coalition) and ignore the fact that the new matching itself could be un-stable as well. Myopic blocking dynamics of this kind have been introduced by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets and have been analyzed for couples markets by Klaus and Klijn (2007) and for (solvable) roommate markets by Diamantoudi et al. (2004) . A model of dynamic network formation based on myopic blocking has been proposed by Jackson and Watts (2002) and modified to roommate markets by Klaus et al. (2008) . In contrast to the myopic approach, another branch of the literature models individuals as farsighted, i.e., agents do not only consider their new match but also potential future changes. Based on the concept of indirect dominance proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and formalized by Chwe (1994) , several contributions investigate farsighted decision making and stability in abstract social situations (e.g., Greenberg, 1990; Chwe, 1994; Xue, 1998) , hedonic coalition formation (e.g., Diamantoudi and Xue, 2003) , or network formation (e.g., Page et al., 2005; Herings et al., 2008; Page and Wooders, 2008) . The various solution concepts considered range from Greenberg's (1990) conservative stable standard of behavior as represented by the largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994) to the optimistic stable standard of behavior as represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. Recently, Mauleon et al. (2008) analyzed von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for two-sided matching markets. According to Mauleon et al. (2008) , for marriage markets and many-to-one matching markets with responsive preferences, the only von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets are the singletons that consist of the stable matchings.
Here, we are interested in von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for roommate markets. First, we use the bi-choice graph technique of Klaus and Klijn (2009) to give a simple characterization of indirect dominance (Proposition 1). Then, we show that a singleton matching is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). Moreover, a pair of matchings can never be a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Lemma 4). However, we provide examples of roommate markets that exhibit no von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 1) and a non-singleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 2), respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the roommate market model. In Section 3, we introduce von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 concludes.
Morgenstern stable set in a marriage market. Wako (2008) showed that each marriage market has a unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. Other myopic solution concepts for roommate markets include maximum stable matchings (Tan, 1990) , stable partitions (Tan, 1991) , almost stable matchings (Abraham et al., 2006) , p-stable matchings (Iñarra et al., 2008a) , and absorbing sets (Iñarra et al., 2008b) .
The Model
In a roommate market, a finite set of agents N has to be partitioned into pairs (roommates) and singletons. Each agent i ∈ N has preferences R i over sharing a room with any of the agents in N\{i} and having a room for himself (or consuming an outside option such as living off-campus). Agents' preferences are total orders 3 over N. In particular, for all i ∈ N, k R i j and j R i k if and only if j = k. The strict preference and indifference relation associated with R i are denoted by P i and I i , respectively. If i P i j then j is unacceptable to i. Since the set of agents N remains fixed throughout this paper, we simply denote a roommate market (Gale and Shapley, 1962) by its preference profile R = (R i ) i∈N .
A solution to a roommate market, a matching µ, is a partition of N into pairs and singletons. Alternatively, a matching is a function µ : N → N of order two, i.e., for all i ∈ N, µ(µ(i)) = i. We denote the set of matchings for all roommate markets defined for the set of agents N by M. Agent µ(i) is agent i's mate, i.e., the agent with whom he is matched to share a room (possibly himself). A matching µ is blocked by a coalition S ⊆ N if there exists a matching µ such that µ (S) = S and for all i ∈ S, µ (i) P i µ(i). If S blocks µ, then S is called a blocking coalition for µ.
Next, we introduce the enforceability notion that we will use throughout the paper, i.e., in the following we describe how a coalition of agents can enforce a matching µ starting from a matching µ. For any matching µ and any coalition S ⊆ N we say that µ results from µ by matching S if µ (S) = S and for all k ∈ N \ S,
i.e., coalition S is (re)matched among itself, previous mates of agents in S who are not in S themselves become single, and all other agents have the same mates as before. We write this as µ → S µ . If for some pair {i, j}, µ → {i,j} µ , then we assume, without loss of generality, that µ (i) = j. 4 In this case we say that the (possibly non-blocking) pair {i, j} is satisfied.
Note that if a coalition S ⊆ N blocks a matching µ, then there exists a pair {i, j} ⊆ S
A matching is individually rational if there is no blocking pair {i, j} with i = j. We denote the set of individually rational matchings for roommate market R by I(R). A matching is stable if there is no blocking pair. We denote the set of stable matchings for roommate market R by S(R). A roommate market R is solvable if S(R) = ∅. Otherwise it is called unsolvable. Note that for any roommate market the set of stable matchings equals the core (due to the fact that the existence of any blocking coalition induces the existence of a blocking pair as already mentioned before).
A marriage market (Gale and Shapley, 1962 ) is a roommate market such that N is the union of two disjoint sets M and W (men and women), and each agent in M (respectively W ) prefers being alone to being matched with any other agent in M (respectively W ). An individually rational matching for a marriage market respects the partition of agents into two types and never matches two men or two women. Gale and Shapley (1962) showed that all marriage markets are solvable and provided an unsolvable roommate market (Gale and Shapley, 1962 , Example 3). Harsanyi (1974) criticizes stability notions based on myopic decision making; he argues that coalitions may enforce a myopically not very attractive outcome in order to set a chain of events in motion that in the end will lead to a preferred outcome for the coalition. The following indirect dominance notion incorporates this insight.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsighted Stability
Matching µ indirectly dominates matching µ, denoted by µ µ, if there exists a sequence of matchings µ = µ 1 , . . . , µ L = µ and a sequence of pairs
5 We refer to such a sequence of pairs as an indirect dominance path of pairs (from µ to µ ) and to the resulting sequence of matchings µ = µ 1 , . . . , µ L = µ as an indirect dominance path of matchings (from µ to µ ).
Note that using coalitions instead of pairs would not change this definition as long as µ is individually rational (since any change by a coalition can be obtained by a sequence of disjoint pairs in this case).
6 Moreover, if coalitions are used only minor changes in the 5 Hence, we follow the standard myopic blocking dynamics used in various papers (e.g., Roth and Vande Vate, 1990; Diamantoudi et al., 2004; Klaus et al., 2008) by assuming that in the sequence of matchings from µ to µ , any matching µ l+1 results from µ l by matching a pair.
6 To see that there is a matching µ that indirectly dominates an individually irrational matching µ by an indirect dominance path of coalitions but does not indirectly dominate µ by an indirect dominance path of pairs, consider the following example. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and 1 P 1 2 P 1 4 P 1 3, 1 P 2 3 P 2 2 P 2 4, proofs are needed to show that all our results still hold.
A set of matchings V ⊆ M is farsightedly internally stable if for all µ, µ ∈ V , µ µ. Every set of matchings V with cardinality |V | = 1 is farsightedly internally stable.
A set of matchings V ⊆ M is farsightedly externally stable if for all matchings µ / ∈ V there exists a matching µ ∈ V such that µ µ. The set of all matchings M is farsightedly externally stable.
A set of matchings V ⊆ M is a von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable set if it is farsightedly internally and externally stable. Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets represent Greenberg's (1990) optimistic stable standard of behavior (OSSB) based on the indirect dominance relation.
Results
We first introduce the bi-choice graph technique of Klaus and Klijn (2009) to prove a useful characterization of indirect dominance. As a by-product, the bi-choice graph technique offers a simple construction of indirect dominance paths between individually rational matchings.
Let R be a roommate market and µ, µ ∈ I(R), µ = µ , such that (a) there is no blocking pair {i , j } for µ with µ (i ) = j and (b) there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ with µ(i) = j. We consider the following bi-choice graph G(µ, µ ) = (N, E). The set of vertices is the set of agents N. The set of edges E consists of the following three types of edges. Let i, j ∈ N. Then, E1. there is a continuous directed edge from i to j, denoted by i j if j = µ(i) P i µ (i), i.e., agent i strictly prefers his match j = µ(i) under µ to his match under µ ; E2. there is a discontinuous directed edge from i to j, denoted by i j if j = µ (i) P i µ(i), i.e., agent i strictly prefers his match j = µ (i) under µ to his match under µ; E3. there is a (continuous) undirected edge between i and j, denoted by i j if j = µ(i) I i µ (i), i.e., agent i is indifferent between his match j = µ(i) under µ and his match under µ . Note that for j = i = µ(i) I i µ (i) we allow for an undirected edge from i to himself; we call such an edge a loop: i .
Lemma 1. Bi-choice graph components
Let R be a roommate market and µ, µ ∈ I(R), µ = µ , such that (a) there is no blocking pair {i , j } for µ with µ (i ) = j and (b) there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ with 
, in contradiction to {i, j} with µ(i) = j and k ∈ {i, j} being a blocking pair for µ . Hence, µ µ implies that there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ with µ(i) = j. ⇐ Assume that there is no blocking pair {i, j} for µ with µ(i) = j. We now explicitly construct an indirect dominance path of pairs from µ to µ in order to show µ µ. First, take any blocking pair {i, j} for µ that is matched under µ (if any) and match agents i and j. Now take any blocking pair for the resulting matching that is matched under µ (if any) and match the involved agents. Continue satisfying blocking pairs one by one in this way, until we obtain a matching µ * such that there is no blocking pair for µ * that is matched under µ . Note that since µ ∈ I(R), all blocking pairs that are satisfied in this procedure are of cardinality 2 and µ * ∈ I(R).
Note that once a blocking pair is satisfied in the procedure it will never be unmatched in the remainder of the procedure. So, 
Recall that in the construction of µ * out of µ once a blocking pair is satisfied it will never be unmatched until we obtain µ * . In fact, for any such blocking pair {i, j} and for any k ∈ {i, j}, µ (k) = µ * (k). But then (1) and (2) imply µ µ, which completes the proof.
By the following lemma, only individually rational matchings can be part of any vNM farsightedly stable set.
Lemma 2. Individual rationality of vNM farsightedly stable sets
Let V be a vNM farsightedly stable set and µ ∈ V . Then, µ is individually rational.
7 There is at least one such cycle because otherwise µ = µ * ; a contradiction.
Proof. Suppose µ ∈ V is not individually rational. Then, there exists a blocking pair {i, i} for µ. Consider µ → {i} µ . By farsighted internal stability, µ / ∈ V . By farsighted external stability, there exists a µ ∈ V such that µ µ . Suppose µ = µ. Then, µ µ . By the proof of ⇒ of Proposition 1, there is no blocking pair for µ matched under µ , which is in contradiction to µ → {i} µ . Hence, µ = µ.
Let In either case, {i}, {i 1 , j 1 }, . . . , {i L−1 , j L−1 } is an indirect dominance path of pairs from µ to µ . Hence, µ µ, which is in contradiction to farsighted internal stability.
The next theorem extends Theorem 1 in Mauleon et al. (2008) to roommate markets.
Theorem 1. Stable matchings and vNM farsightedly stable sets A singleton {µ} is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if µ is stable.

Proof. ⇒
Suppose {µ} is a vNM farsightedly stable set and µ is not stable. Then, there is a blocking pair {i, j} for µ. By Lemma 2, µ ∈ I(R). Consider µ → {i,j} µ . Note that µ ∈ I(R). By Proposition 1, µ µ because there exists a blocking pair {i, j} for µ with µ (i) = j. This contradicts farsighted external stability of {µ}. ⇐ Let µ be stable. Since any singleton is farsighted internally stable, we only have to prove that {µ} is farsighted externally stable. Let µ = µ be a (possibly individually irrational) matching. Let {i 1 , . . . , i k } be the agents that under µ are matched in an individually irrational way. Consider µ and unmatch all agents in {i 1 , . . . , i k }. Denote the resulting matching by µ .
Since µ is stable and µ ∈ I(R), Proposition 1 immediately implies µ µ . Let {i 1 , j 1 }, . . . , {i L−1 , j L−1 } be an indirect dominance path of pairs from µ to µ. Since µ is individually rational, all agents in {i 1 , . . . , i k } will strictly prefer µ to µ . This implies
The ⇐ -part is related to Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) who show that for hedonic games with strict preferences any partition that is in the core indirectly dominates any other partition.
While Theorem 1 implies the existence of a vNM farsightedly stable set in any solvable roommate market (and in particular in any marriage market), the following example presents an (unsolvable) roommate market without any vNM farsightedly stable set.
Example 1. A roommate market without a vNM farsightedly stable set
We consider the following unsolvable roommate market with three agents N = {1, 2, 3}. Table 1 lists agents' preferences in its columns, e.g., agent 1's preferences are such that 2 P 1 3 P 1 1. agent 1 agent 2 agent 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 2 3 
Using Proposition 1 it is readily verified that the only indirect dominance relations between the matchings are the following: µ 1 µ 2 µ 3 µ 1 , µ 1 µ 0 , µ 2 µ 0 , and µ 3 µ 0 . Suppose there exists a vNM farsightedly stable set V . Clearly, by farsighted internal stability, |V | < 2. Thus, V = {µ} for some µ ∈ M. Since the set of stable matchings S(R) = ∅, this contradicts Theorem 1.
The next results give some more insights into the structure of von NeumannMorgenstern farsightedly stable sets.
Lemma 3. Mutual blocking in vNM farsightedly stable sets
Let V be a vNM farsightedly stable set. For any two matchings µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ V with µ 1 = µ 2 there is a blocking pair {i 1 , j 1 } for µ 1 with µ 2 (i 1 ) = j 1 and there is a blocking pair {i 2 , j 2 } for µ 2 with µ 1 (i 2 ) = j 2 .
Proof. Let µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ V with µ 1 = µ 2 . By Lemma 2, µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ I(R). Suppose that there is no blocking pair {i 1 , j 1 } for µ 1 with µ 2 (i 1 ) = j 1 . Then, by Proposition 1, µ 1 µ 2 ; contradicting farsighted internal stability. Hence, there is a blocking pair {i 1 , j 1 } for µ 1 with µ 2 (i 1 ) = j 1 . The proof that there is a blocking pair {i 2 , j 2 } for µ 2 with µ 1 (i 2 ) = j 2 is similar.
Next, we prove that no vNM farsightedly stable set can be composed of exactly two elements.
Lemma 4. Two element vNM farsightedly stable sets do not exist
For any vNM farsightedly stable set V , |V | = 2.
Proof. Suppose V = {µ 1 , µ 2 } with µ 1 = µ 2 . Then, by Lemma 3, there is a blocking pair {i 1 , j 1 } for µ 1 with µ 2 (i 1 ) = j 1 and there is a blocking pair {i 2 , j 2 } for µ 2 with µ 1 (i 2 ) = j 2 .
Take any blocking pair {i, j} for µ 2 that is matched under µ 1 (note that there is at least one such blocking pair) and match agents i and j. Now take any blocking pair for the resulting matching that is matched under µ 1 (if any) and match the involved agents. Continue satisfying blocking pairs one by one in this way, until we obtain a matching µ 2 such that there is no blocking pair for µ 2 that is matched under µ 1 . By Lemma 2, µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ I(R). Hence, all blocking pairs that are satisfied in this procedure are of cardinality 2 and µ 2 ∈ I(R). By construction and Proposition 1, µ 2 µ 2 . Furthermore, by construction, there are no blocking pairs {i , j } for µ 2 with µ 2 (i ) = j . Hence, by Proposition 1, µ 2 µ 2 . Thus, by farsighted internal stability, µ 2 / ∈ V . Next, by farsighted internal stability we have that µ 1 µ 2 . Thus, by Proposition 1, there exists a blocking pair {i, j} for µ 1 with µ 2 (i) = j. Note that neither i nor j are then involved in a blocking pair of µ 2 that is matched under µ 1 . Hence, by construction of µ 2 , µ 2 (i) = j. Thus, there exists a blocking pair {i, j} for µ 1 with µ 2 (i) = j and by Proposition 1, µ 1 µ 2 . Since also µ 2 µ 2 , this is in contradiction to farsighted external stability of V .
Lemma 4 excludes the existence of a vNM farsightedly stable set with two matchings for roommate markets. A stronger result for the subclass of marriage markets is stated in Mauleon et al. (2008, Theorem 2) , according to which any vNM farsightedly stable set is a singleton that consists of a stable matching. Independently from Mauleon et al. (2008) we have established the nonexistence of vNM farsightedly stable sets with three matchings for marriage markets. We have relegated the statement and proof of this result to the Appendix (Lemma 5).
Our final example shows, however, that Lemma 5 cannot be generalized to the class of roommate markets. It presents an (unsolvable) roommate market with a vNM farsightedly stable set that consists of three matchings. In particular, the example shows that roommate markets can exhibit a vNM farsightedly stable set with un-stable matchings, which is not the case for marriage markets according to Mauleon et al. (2008, Theorem 2) .
Example 2. A three element vNM farsightedly stable set
We consider an unsolvable roommate market with six agents N = {1, . . . , 6}. Table 2 lists agents' preferences in its columns, e.g., agent 1's preferences are such that 2 P 1 3 P 1 1 · · · where "· · · " represents any ordering of the remaining agents. 
Let V = {µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 }. To see that V is internally stable, consider w.l.o.g. µ 1 . First, notice that {4, 5} is a blocking pair for µ 2 that is matched under µ 1 . So, by Proposition 1, µ 2 does not indirectly dominate µ 1 . Second, notice that {1, 2} is a blocking pair for µ 3 that is matched under µ 1 . So, again by Proposition 1, µ 3 does not indirectly dominate µ 1 . Hence, µ 1 is not indirectly dominated by another matching in V . Analogously it can be shown that µ 2 and µ 3 are not indirectly dominated by another matching in V . Hence, V is internally stable.
To see that V is externally stable, consider a matching µ / ∈ V (possibly individually irrational) and construct the following sequence of matchings.
Step I: Unmatch pairs of agents that are matched in an individually irrational way and denote the resulting matching byμ. Ifμ ∈ V , we have established an indirect dominance path from µ to a matching in V .
Step II: Suppose thatμ / ∈ V . Note thatμ ∈ I(R). Supposeμ has no matched pairs. Then,μ = µ 0 . Then, Step I and subsequently matching {1, 2} and {4, 5} constitutes an indirect dominance path from µ to µ 1 . Hence, there exists an indirect dominance path from µ to a matching in V .
Supposeμ has exactly one matched pair. By the symmetric construction of the example, assume without loss of generality thatμ = [{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}] . Then, Step I and subsequently matching {4, 5} constitutes an indirect dominance path from µ to µ 1 . Hence, there exists an indirect dominance path from µ to a matching in V .
Supposeμ has exactly two matched pairs. Then, for some i ∈ {4, . . . , 9},μ = µ i . Let µ = µ 4 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {5, 6}, {4}] . Then, Step I and subsequently matching {2, 3} constitutes an indirect dominance path from µ to µ 2 ∈ V . Letμ = µ 5 = [{1, 2}, {3}, {4, 6}, {5}] . Then, Step I and subsequently matching {2, 3, } and {5, 6} constitutes an indirect dominance path from µ to µ 2 ∈ V . Similarly, if for some i = 6, 7, 8, 9,μ = µ i , then there exists an indirect dominance path from µ to a matching in V . We list one indirect dominance path by means of blocking pairs for each matching µ i , i ∈ {4, . . . , 9}, in Table 3 . Hence, any µ / ∈ V is indirectly dominated by a matching in V and V is externally stable.
matching outside of V blocking pairs to be matched resulting matching in 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown a strong relation between stable matchings of a roommate market, i.e., matchings that are not myopically blocked by a pair of agents, and singleton vNM farsightedly stable sets: a singleton set is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if its element is stable (Theorem 1). Thus, a matching is myopically stable if and only if it farsightedly (indirectly) dominates any other matching. Hence, for roommate markets, the myopic notion of (pairwise) stability also induces farsighted stability. For the subclass of marriage markets, according to Mauleon et al. (2008, Theorems 2) , also the converse is true: the only vNM farsightedly stable sets are singleton sets with stable matchings. We find that results for roommate markets can differ in two fundamental ways from those for marriage markets. First, for roommate markets it is possible that a vNM farsightedly stable set exists while no "myopic prediction" can be made (Example 2 describes a roommate market with no stable matchings, but with a non-empty vNM farsightedly stable set). Second, while the existence of stable matchings for marriage markets also guarantees a "farsighted prediction," for roommate markets it is possible that no vNM farsightedly stable set exists (Example 1). Hence, for an unsolvable roommate market there never exists a singleton vNM farsightedly stable set while a non-singleton vNM farsightedly stable set may or may not exist. For solvable roommate markets, at least one singleton vNM farsightedly stable set always exists and it is easy to construct solvable roommate markets (e.g., marriage markets) without non-singleton vNM farsightedly stable sets. Whether there exists a solvable roommate market with a non-singleton vNM farsightedly stable set, however, is currently an open question.
A Appendix
Lemma 5. Three element vNM farsightedly stable sets do not exist for marriage markets For any vNM farsightedly stable set V of a marriage market, |V | = 3.
Proof. Let V be a non-singleton vNM farsightedly stable set and consider a graph with the set of vertices V and directed edges ; {i,j} where µ 1 ; {i,j} µ 2 indicates that {i, j} is a blocking pair for µ 1 that is matched under µ 2 . Note that the graph has no loops, i.e., there is no edge from a matching µ 1 ∈ V to itself. By Lemma 3, there exists at least one edge from any matching in V to any other matching in V .
Let µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ V , µ 1 = µ 2 . Consider any {i, j} with µ 1 ; {i,j} µ 2 . Let µ 1 → {i,j}μ1 , i.e.,μ 1 is the matching that results from µ 1 by matching {i, j}. By internal stability of V ,μ 1 / ∈ V . By external stability of V , there exists a matching µ 1 ∈ V with µ 1 μ 1 . By Lemma 2, µ 1 ∈ I(R). So, by definition ofμ 1 and {i, j},μ 1 ∈ I(R). Note also that µ 1 ∈ I(R). Hence, by Proposition 1, there is no blocking pair for µ 1 that is matched underμ 1 . In particular, µ 1 = µ 1 . By Lemma 3, however, there is a blocking pair {i 1 , j 1 } for µ 1 that is matched under µ 1 . Since µ 1 → {i,j}μ1 , the only agents who have different mates under µ 1 andμ 1 are i, j, µ 1 (i), and µ 1 (j). Then, the only two possibilities of blocking pairs for µ 1 that are matched under µ 1 but not matched underμ 1 are {i, µ 1 (i)} and {j, µ 1 (j)}. Let w.l.o.g. {i, µ 1 (i)} be a blocking pair for µ 1 that is matched under µ 1 but not matched underμ 1 . Hence, µ 1 ; {i,µ 1 (i)} µ 1 ; {i,j} µ 2 .
Suppose V = {µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 }. As there are no loops, µ 1 = µ 1 . Suppose that µ 1 = µ 2 . Then, µ 2 = µ 1 ; {i,µ 1 (i)} µ 1 implies that i strictly prefers µ 1 (i) to µ 2 (i) = j. However, since µ 1 ; {i,j} µ 2 , agent i strictly prefers j to µ 1 (i). This contradiction, together with µ 1 ∈ V , shows that µ 1 = µ 3 .
Let µ 3 → {i,µ 1 (i)}μ3 . By internal stability of V ,μ 3 / ∈ V . By external stability of V , there exists a matching µ 3 ∈ V with µ 3 μ 3 . By Lemma 2, µ 3 ∈ I(R). So, by definition ofμ 3 and {i, µ 1 (i)},μ 3 ∈ I(R). Note also that µ 3 ∈ I(R). Hence, by Proposition 1, there is no blocking pair for µ 3 that is matched underμ 3 . In particular, µ 3 = µ 3 . By Lemma 3, however, there is a blocking pair {i 3 , j 3 } for µ 3 that is matched under µ 3 . Since µ 3 → {i,µ 1 (i)}μ3 , the only agents who have different mates under µ 3 andμ 3 are i, µ 1 (i), µ 3 (i), and µ 3 (µ 1 (i)). The only two possibilities of blocking pairs for µ 3 that are matched Let {k, l} be such that µ 3 ; {k,l} µ 2 . Since µ 3 ∈ I(R), {k, l} is a blocking pair of cardinality 2. Suppose w.l.o.g. that k ∈ M. Then, i, k ∈ M and j, l ∈ W . Case I: Suppose {k, l} ∩ {i, j} = ∅. Hence, since µ 2 (k) = l and µ 2 (i) = j, k = i and l = j. Thus, {i, j} is a blocking pair for µ 1 and µ 3 that is matched under µ 2 . Let µ 2 → {i 3 ,j 3 }μ2 . By internal stability of V ,μ 2 / ∈ V . Note that all matchings in V have a blocking pair that is matched underμ 2 ({i, j} or {i 3 , j 3 }). Hence, byμ 2 ∈ I(R) and Proposition 1, there exists no µ ∈ V with µ μ 2 , which is in contradiction to the assumption that V = {µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 } is a vNM farsightedly stable set. Hence, {k, l} ∩ {i, j} = ∅.
Case II: Suppose k = i 3 . Then, µ 2 ; {k,j 3 } µ 3 ; {k,l} µ 2 . Hence, µ 2 P k µ 3 P k µ 2 , which contradicts the transitivity of P k . Case III: Suppose l = j 3 . Then, µ 2 ; {i 3 ,l} µ 3 ; {k,l} µ 2 . Hence, µ 2 P l µ 3 P l µ 2 , which contradicts the transitivity of P l . Case IV: Since i 3 , k ∈ M and j 3 , l ∈ W , this remaining case covers {i 3 , j 3 } ∩ {k, l} = ∅. Let µ 2 → {i 3 ,j 3 }μ2 . By internal stability of V ,μ 2 / ∈ V . Note that all matchings in V have a blocking pair that is matched underμ 2 ({i, j}, {k, l}, or {i 3 , j 3 }). Hence, byμ 2 ∈ I(R) and Proposition 1, there exists no µ ∈ V with µ μ 2 , which is in contradiction to the assumption that V = {µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 } is a vNM farsightedly stable set.
